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**: AARHUS UNIVERSITY  
DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE AND  
SOCIETY  
: VELUX FOUNDATION PROJECT  
'TOWARDS GOOD SOCIETY'**

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**: 4<sup>TH</sup> INTERNATIONAL PHD CONFERENCE  
OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR POLITICAL  
HISTORY**

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**22 TO 25 JUNE 2016,  
PREBEN HORNUNG STUEN**

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**Political History and  
Intellectual History**

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**Intellectual History as  
Political History**

**Wednesday, 22 June**

1630 Registration and Welcome

1730 – 1900

*Roundtable Debate -*

*Political History in the 21st Century*

Ido de Haan, Pasi Ihalainen, Maartje Janse,  
Duncan Kelly, Marc Lazar, Hagen Schulz-Forberg  
(Moderator)

1900 Reception in **Mogens Zieler Stuen**

**Thursday, 23 June**

**Mogens Zieler Stuen**

0930-1100

*Conceptual Roots: Rule of Law and Work*

Papers: Jesper Lundsby Skov, Esben Bøgh  
Sørensen

Chair: Pasi Ihalainen

Discussants: Henk te Velde / Jacob Jensen  
(Skov), Jesper Lundsby Skov (Sørensen)

**Preben Hornung Stuen**

0930 – 1100

*French Conservative and Progressive Thought*

Papers: Mia Schatz, Charles Lenoir

Chair: Margit van der Steeg

Discussants: Christine Vodovar/ Zachris  
Haaparinne (Lenoir), Selim Nadi (Schatz)

1100 – 1115 Coffee

1115 – 1245

*Intellectuals and Human Rights in the Interwar Period*

Papers: Theresa Hornischer, Alexandre Boza

Chair: Christine Vodovar

Discussants: Marc Lazar / Mia Schatz

(Hornischer), Theresa Hornischer (Boza)

1245 – 1415 Lunch

1415 – 1500

*How to Study the Early Modern Public Sphere?*

*Methodological Reflections*

Paper: Zachris Haaparinne

Chair: Ido de Haan

Discussants: Maartje Janse / Esben Bøgh

Sørensen

Stretch Legs

1515 – 1645

*Approaches to Political and Intellectual History:*

*Frame Analysis and Re-thought Marxism*

Papers: Anders Dalsager, Selim Nadi

Chair: Marc Lazar

Discussants: Pasi Ihalainen / Kristina Krake

(Dalsager), Martin Beddeleem (Nadi)

1645 – 1700 Coffee

**1700 Michel Foucault as Historian of Political Thought**

**Keynote by Duncan Kelly**

2000 Conference Dinner

## Friday, 24 June

0930 – 1100

*Liberal Internationalism in the Interwar Period*

Papers: Emil Eiby Seidenfaden, Søren Friis

Chair: Maartje Janse

Discussants: Katja Naumann / (Alexandre Boza

(Seidenfaden), Tom Hoctor (Friis)

1100 – 1115 Coffee

1115 – 1245

*Transnational Conceptual Struggles after 1945:*

*Neoliberalism and Left Radicalism*

Papers: Arne Kaethner, Juho Saksholm

Chair: Hagen Schulz-Forberg

Discussants: Ido de Haan / Selim Nadi

(Kaethner), Arne Kaethner (Saksholm)

1245 – 1415 Lunch

1415 – 1500

*Early Neoliberalism's Scientification*

Paper: Martin Beddeleem

Chair: Giovanni Orsina

Discussants: Duncan Kelly / Søren Friis

Stretch Legs

1515 – 1645

*Neo-Corporatism and Flexicurity: Dutch and Nordic Forms of Economisation.*

Papers: Tom Hoctor, Tom Schuringa

Chair: Henk te Velde

Discussants: Niklas Olsen / Jette Baagø

Klockmann (Hoctor), Anders Dalsager

(Schuringa)

1645 – 1700 Coffee

**1700 On Thought Collectives and Think Tank Archipelagos: The History of Transnational Neoliberalism**

**Keynote by Dieter Plehwe**

1900 Dinner in **Mogens Zieler Stuen**

## Saturday, 25 June

1000 – 1130

*Liberalism, the Welfare State and Public Choice*

Papers: Kristina Krake, Jacob Jensen

Chair: Niklas Olsen

Discussants: Giovanni Orsina / Juho Saksholm  
(Krake), Tom Schuringa (Jensen)

1130 – 1145 Coffee

1145 – 1230

*Memory Diplomacy*

Paper: Jette Baagø Klockmann

Chair: Søren Friis

Discussants: Hagen Schulz-Forberg / Charles  
Lenoir

1230 – 1300 *Final Discussion and  
Announcements*

1300 Lunch

End of Conference

## List of Participants

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38. Zachris Haaparinne, *University of Jyväskylä*, zachris.e.haaparinne@student.jyu.fi

## ABSTRACTS

### ROUND TABLE, 22 JUNE

#### POLITICAL HISTORY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

##### Marc Lazar

*Political History in time of mutations of our democracies*

What does it mean to do and to write political history in our times? This is my question for this round table. I wonder if the historians specialized in political history of the twentieth century can remain indifferent to what is happening around us, especially in Europe.

First of all, I would like to reflect on the main present changes we currently experience. I just quote some of them: important mutations of our democracies, emergence of the audience democracy, disaffection toward institutions, rejection of the ruling class, development of so-called protest and populist movements, return of nationalist parties and propositions, deep crisis of the European construction, issue of migrants and immigration, capacity or incapacity of integration, terrorist threat, and so on.

So here comes my crucial question: can political historians, and mainly those who are specialised in twentieth century history or of our present times, ignore these challenges? My answer is negative. Obviously, I don't say we would have to do a militant history. Absolutely not. But I argue that we have a double responsibility for both scientific knowledge and the public debate.

For the scientific dimension, avoiding the trap of determinism, I think we have to do a renewal of the history of our European democracies by studying topics such as: the question of leadership, the legitimacy of the ruling class, the European construction, thus articulating political history and social history together. We have to conceive more and more a "total" political history associating the history of institutions with for instance the history of collective mobilizations and the study of what we could call "infra-politics", a history which does not cancel the national level but integrates the relationship between this level and wider, even global ones.

I also argue that historians have to be present in the public debate. Sociologists, political scientists and lawyers are very often in the first line, presenting their expertise. But historians have also something to say on the present. For instance, on nationalism, earlier experiences of protest and populist movements, on policies of immigration and their impact on politics and societies, on racism or antisemitism, on the phenomena of terrorism, on the relationship between ruling class and people and so on.

##### Ido de Haan

*The politics of political history*

Political history has always been entangled with politics, by accounting for, legitimizing or criticizing, a certain type of rule, a specific regime, or the acts of rulers - often focused on military victories and dynastic politics. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, this entanglement has received an institutional form in the professionalization of history, based on collection and analysis of sources in state archives. Moreover, until the middle of the twentieth century, historians generally wrote national history, often from a didactical perspective to educate citizens of their national state. In opposition to these 'staatstragende' historians, others wrote the history of social movements and marginalized groups, often from an even more outspoken political commitment. While the 'official' historians often denied the political - contested - nature of their histories, oppositional historians wrote their work with the aim to politicize - denaturalize - the histories of nation and state.

This entanglement is part of the reason why political history became so vulnerable to the critique on its 'evenementiel' and superficial nature: political historians, according to this critique, were no more than sophisticated journalists or activist, obsessed with the issues of the present, thereby overlooking the impact of the *longue durée*. This impression was reinforced by the fact that many political historians were also involved in political commentary or actual political participation.

In response to this critique, 'new' political history turned into the history of politics, focusing on the long-term changes in the intellectual, practical and institutional formation of politics. This shift has raised the awareness that political historians in the past have focused on specific aspect of politics, at the

detriment of other aspects, and helped to historicize their understanding of the object of their study (and in the process releasing them from a national and state-oriented perspective). Yet at the same time, the historical contextualization of 'politics', and the analysis of the role of political historians in constructions of the political, makes clear that also the historian of politics cannot avoid to politicize or depoliticize - and therefore better be candid about his or her politics.

**Pasi Ihalainen & Taina Saarinen, University of Jyväskylä**

*Bringing language research, intellectual history and political history together in the analysis of parliamentary debates as a nexus*

Historians of political discourse and language researchers should join forces to develop methods of textual analysis that can bring political and intellectual history – and the study of material realities and of social constructs more generally – together. Collaboration motivated by recent versions of social constructivism in human sciences enables us to analyse political discourses in the past and present more systematically. Focus on the discursive nature of politics and the analytical concepts of nexus, multi-sitedness, historical trajectories, historical body and mobility deepens our understanding of the multi-level dynamics of policy-making, including transnational transfers. Our examples are derived from a comparative and transnational analysis of constitutional debates at the time of the democratisation of suffrage and the parliamentarisation of government in the last phase of the First World War, with a special focus on Sweden and Finland.

**Maartje Janse, Leiden University**

*Political Protest as a Force for Political Change*

As politics is an essentially contested concept, all political interactions implicate an answer to the following three questions: what is considered to be a legitimate political issue, who is considered a legitimate political actor, and what is considered legitimate behavior when participating in politics? The history of politics since the Age of Revolution can be told as the story of a dramatic expansion of all three dimensions of politics, that of political issues, political actors and political styles. To answer the question how people's understanding of politics

broadened in these three dimensions, it is insufficient to focus on the history of political institutions. Even though we can identify these changes within institutions – think only of the way new issues, new members and new communication styles deeply altered parliamentary practices during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – these changes were often initiated outside of political institutions.

One of the most important changes brought about by the cultural turn in political history is the broadening of the scope of political history. At the beginning of the twenty-first century it is no longer considered a radical to state that political change often began outside of the political domain. The history of religion, gender, science, literature, language, and art, for instance, has been fruitfully connected to a broad history of politics, and has made it clear that the interconnections between different domains were stronger than the overspecialized historical discipline has made it seem for a long time.

This perspective has opened up possibilities to study political change as something that begins outside of the centers of political power but that has proved to be able to deeply impact practices and attitudes within these centers in time. In my contribution to this project I propose to study political change as a product of the challenges political outsiders posed to existing political systems and dominant conceptions of politics. In order to do so, I will discuss the way political protest has shaped political history from the late eighteenth century on.

**Duncan Kelly**

*Intellectual History as Political History*

Traditionally, of course, the link between intellectual history and political history has been more than a little strained. Political historians, particularly high political historians and diplomatic historians too, have disavowed the usefulness of intellectual history to their enterprise. To put it in the terms of debates that later became influential in the history of political thought as intellectual history, Lewis Namier decried the attempt to prioritize ideas over interests, national and courtly interests in particular, as little more than window dressing (or “flapdoodle”). Ideas simply rationalized, after the fact, what had already been determined anyway for other reasons, and if you wanted to understand the

politics of the past, the best way was to go through political history as high politics.

The by-now conventional response, of course, is that what was thought possible or justifiable in the first place, whether consciously or unconsciously, by high-political actors was already structured by their frames of reference, by expectations about what could, or could not, be justified and described (or re-described) as legitimate. That need for legitimation presumed a series of more or less acceptable routes through a problem. Just think now, of how weird it sounds hearing, say, Donald Trump say things that most party politicians can't or won't say, not just because of the big picture presupposition that he's part of an 'elite' that's not 'the elite', for example. But instead, perhaps think of the problem as explaining when, why, and how what came to be normal political language and discourse became so polarized that Trump-ism, for instance, could seem legitimate in a presidential primary race.

To explain that, you need to have a sense of the deep-seated cultural and political assumptions behind the language, a sense of norms and conventions, and a sense of what is, or is not, conceptually as well as politically novel here. And in doing that, you might want to think back to the classic problem of what someone is, or isn't, able to do with words. To focus on their meaning, that is, which is to say, to consider precisely the things that high political historians and historians of diplomacy have always said they are interested in. Take another example, the reconstruction of the web of language and the problems of timing in tracing German decision-making in July 1914. Diplomatic historians have followed the minutiae of which telegrams landed where, and when, and how delays in information meant that political calculations were possible one minute, and implausible the next. But through their language, too, historians have tried to focus on what such decisions tell us about what James Joll called the 'unspoken assumptions' behind political leadership. And to understand that, you need to think about the sorts of ideas, cultural assumptions, educational background, political conflicts, economic limits, and so on and so forth, all fixed in one short-term moment that is itself part of a long-term perspective. You need to see the relationship between intellectual history and political history, that is, as part of the history of political thought. That, I think, might be one interesting way to find a path into our discussion for

this conference, whether the connecting thread is, in fact, a generous and reasonably expansive account of the history of political thought itself. Not reducible to some hitherto emblematic or vaguely specified notion of 'context', nor simply to questions of intentions (though they really do matter, whether in terms of their success or, more often in politics, their short and long term failures). But instead, through a sense of the relationship between past to present that might be seen in the same way that someone like Keynes thought about the issue, metaphorically, through economic terminology where long-run equilibrium with institutional and cultural foundations is disrupted by short-term periods of fluctuation and rupture (conceptual innovation, if you like). But the way that those moments of rupture are dealt with precisely presupposes our having a sense of the assumptions that those who deal with them happen to hold at those moments, and this in turn relates to the sort of ideas they have learned, upheld, justified, and challenged, over the course of a generation or more. For one other challenge Keynes might pose for our discussions here too, is the sense that ideas are only really viable over this rough generational time-span, before they are subject to change or their utility declines. When the facts change, we need to change our minds; or, perhaps, we need to do our own thinking for ourselves, as another Cambridge-inspired dictum has it. What that means, though, is not always so clear, in that we might very well not be able to do our own thinking for ourselves at all if we are so shaped by our generational pasts. Or, that we cannot do our own political thinking for ourselves, if we cannot take the measure of how our own thinking might blind us to new opportunities or threats. Or indeed, that the best set of resources for thinking about our contemporary politics comes from the history of political and economic thinking. As my own country chooses to vote on whether to Remain, or to pursue Brexit, with party splits in the Tory camp, and an odd situation with Labour whose leader is a product of 1970s Bennite debates about the party, and whose mantra was about withdrawal from Europe as a capitalist club back then, is now supporting Remain because it looks like there is no credible left alternative, such thoughts about the powerful relationship between generational timeframes and political moments of judgment seem entirely like the sorts of things we should be focusing on!

**THURSDAY, 23 JUNE**

***Mogens Zieler Stuen***

0930-1100

*Conceptual Roots: Rule of Law and Work*

**Jesper Lundsby Skov**

*The rule of law in Denmark in 1848-1849*

The famous political scientist Francis Fukuyama made Denmark the ideal type of a modern state in his ambitious book *The Origins of Political Order* (2011). According to Fukuyama, Denmark transformed into a modern state in the 18th and 19th century, and it was during this period that three institutions emerged, which formed the basis of the modern state: a strong state, a rule of law, and a responsible government. While the first and last claim by Fukuyama are uncontroversial, the second, the establishment of a rule of law in the 18th and 19th century, is not. Other historians (e.g. Harald Jørgensen and Mogens Herman Hansen) have made the same argument, but the empirical evidence is deficient.

This paper will discuss the influence of the idea of the rule of law in the making of the Danish constitution of 1849. The 1849 constitution changed the Danish system of government from an absolutist to a constitutional one, consequently limiting the power of the king. But how was the king's power to be limited? By parliament? If so, how was the power of the parliament to be controlled? How imagined the members of the constituent assembly to secure the freedom of the citizen from the power of the state? The hypothesis of the paper is that the idea of the rule of law was strong among the liberal members of the constituent assembly which formed the political center, but that their interpretation of the constitution as a rule of law type of constitution was undermined by mainly the left and to a lesser degree the right side of the assembly.

The historiography on the constituent assembly in 1848-49 is fairly vast, but the research has mostly focused on the concept of democracy in the period, and the background for the relatively democratic franchise granted in the constitution. To examine the influence of the idea of the rule of law, one has to ask different questions to the source material. This is primarily the records of the negotiations in the constituent assembly. Hence, the paper will discuss three key points: 1) The opinions on the role of the Highest Court and the judges, 2) The views on

individual rights, and 3) The attitudes toward the constitution as an idea. Depending on the conceptions of these three elements and the relationships between them, this paper investigates the idea of the rule of law among the members of the constituent assembly in 1848-49, and to what extent this idea influenced the writing and interpretation of the constitution of 1849. Thus, the paper will shed new light on Fukuyama's claim that Denmark in an early state developed the rule of law.

**Esben Bøgh Sørensen**

*The World of Work in Early Modern Britain*

In 16<sup>th</sup> - 17<sup>th</sup> Century Britain attitudes to work and workers became increasingly embedded in discourses on the social and economic usefulness of different human activities and different social groups. Contemporaries worried about what they thought of as idleness and vagrancy and became obsessed with the idea that everyone should be usefully occupied. Employment was the word of the day.

This paper will explore the economic concept of work as it developed in early modern Britain with special focus on the concept of "useful work" in texts such as social utopias and political and economic treatises. The paper will contextualise these various economic conceptualisations of work within the development early (agrarian) capitalism, which caused the slow development of an integrated domestic market, growing international trade, centralisation of the state and an increase in proletarianisation. Especially the upsurge of wage dependent workers without any other access to the means of subsistence became an important topic and worry of contemporaries.

Enclosure, engrossment and the change in property relations together with the decline of customary rights, also prompted different kinds of reactions from political and economic thinkers. Some harshly criticised these measures and believed they were responsible for the social and economic problems of the time, while others were more positive and saw an opportunity for economic development.

The paper suggests that in contrast to earlier attitudes to work these reactions to early agrarian capitalism in Britain marked the beginning of a specific economic concept of work that were no longer embedded in moral and religious concerns. In the context of 16th-17th Century Britain this



economic conceptualisation of work was, however, highly contested.

### ***Preben Hornung Stuen***

0930 – 1100

*French Conservative and Progressive Thought*

#### **Mia Schatz**

In a tone of moral confidence, Gaston Goldschild proclaimed in a letter to résistant, political activist, and journalist Claude Bourdet in October 1955 that “Censorship is the weapon of the weak, and clémenciste methods...have not prevented facts from coming out on top.” As Goldschild penned his unequivocal support, Bourdet sat in a Parisian prison cell. The newspaper for which Bourdet served as director, *France-Observateur*, had been seized by Mendès-France’s government in late September after the appearance of his “tendentious” article, “Pas de contingent pour la sale guerre” and he was arrested shortly after. *France-Obs* had already been seized a number of times in Algeria, but this was the first time it was confiscated in the metropole—a sure sign of the government’s increased unease. By 1958, the newspaper had been seized a remarkable 7 times in France. This number, however, pales in comparison to the 53 confiscation incidents in Algeria that had taken place during the previous eighteen months alone, amounting to an £11,000 blow to the paper’s revenue.

Why would the writers and editors at *France-Obs* continue to risk their business and their own liberty in order to expose French iniquities in Algeria? In order to begin to answer this question, our task will be to understand the way in which this branch of the French far left (i.e. *la Nouvelle Gauche*) imagined the media’s duty in society. Specifically, I will investigate French notions of *la liberté de la presse* through the lens of Claude Bourdet, who served both as Director of *France-Obs* and as *dirigeant* of the *Nouvelle Gauche* throughout the 1950s. In addition to utilizing a body of impressive secondary sources, I will draw extensively upon primary material (mainly correspondence) from the papers of both Claude Bourdet and one of his co-founders, Gilles Martinet, as well as upon a variety of newspapers and magazines. Acknowledging Martin Evans’ argument that the “memory of résistance” played a vital role in tinting the lens through which former résistants, like Bourdet, viewed France’s violent actions in Algeria, I

will argue that this interpretation of French anti-imperial efforts is insufficiently complex for the editorial group at *France-Obs*, which committed itself to fighting colonialism when such action was still quite unpopular.

Indeed, it is not insignificant that Goldschild—himself a former résistant from the German side who operated under the alias Gaston Georges Delor—wrote to Bourdet about the inefficacy of the French government’s attempts to “silence” reporting on its activities in Algeria.

Ultimately, I will demonstrate how *France-Obs*’ anticolonial endeavours—both journalistic (through the newspapers’ publication) and political (through the creation of the *Nouvelle Gauche*)—articulated a critique at the level of deep structure. They aimed therefore not only to influence and change French colonial policy, but, more importantly, to reshape global consciousness away from imperialism. In so doing, they sought to create non-communist far-left political alliances across Europe, North and West Africa, and the United States.

### **Charles Lenoir**

*Political conservatism alongside intellectual conservatism? Redefining conservative thought in regards to the state at the turn of the century, France – United States, early 20th century.*

This paper aims to redefine conservatism in the context of changing political societal at the end of the 19th century on the political stage. The processes of industrialization, urbanization and democratization presented a challenge to established institutions, as well as to political and social elites of Western societies. These evolutions led to the growing popular pressure in favor of the development of state’s role, especially in economic and social sphere. Questioning the notion of conservatism helps us to understand the deep transformation of this movement which defined itself in relation to the rise of the modern state and more broadly with democracy.

Focusing on the cases of conservatism in France and the United States allows an examination of this notion in political environments where few political figures claimed to be conservative and where conservatism had a rather negative connotation. At the same time different conservative trends and discourses existed on the French and American political and intellectual stages. This paper aims to highlight the possible connections and influences as

well as differences and even tensions between the intellectual and political conservative spheres at the beginning of the 20th century.

Several key intellectual figures could illustrate these transformations of both intellectual and political conservatism. At the end of the 19th century, this movement was increasingly concerned with the defense of liberty and the struggle against socialism, bringing a deep renewing of political thought. This period appeared as a transition towards a new conservatism, even if the intellectual influence of traditionalism did not fading away and even knew a new surge. In order to underline conservatives' adaptation to new issues, it is crucial to analyze the views of key intellectuals, such as William Graham Sumner or Henry Adams in the United States and Georges Picot or Leroy-Beaulieu brothers in France. These figures were representative of this conservative-liberal thought which emerged in reaction to the new industrial society. Their writings should be analyzed alongside the position of conservative political figures in the parliamentary arena where main measures related to the role of the state were enacted.

The use of parliamentary and congressional debates, as well as political and intellectual reviews and newspapers allows for an exploration of the stance of main conservative figures, especially through discourse analysis. It will emphasize the articulation between conservatism, resistance and modernity. Moreover the study of potential connections between the intellectual and political sphere thanks to private correspondence will help to draw the possible mutual influence regarding the development of a new political discourse responding to the new century's challenges. Through these different sources, this paper seeks to document a coherent conservative stance across the Atlantic against the rise of the modern state.

1115 – 1245

*Intellectuals and Human Rights in the Interwar Period*

**Theresa Hornischer**

*Female intellectuals in France between the two World Wars: the case of Léo Wanner.*

The question of what an intellectual is and which term of intellectual the legitimate one is, has been preoccupying the research about intellectuals for

some time. Different ideal types of intellectuals are being created in numerous studies.

All studies have one thing in common: the omission of woman in the systematic analysis of intellectual figures. The term "intellectual" stayed connoted male in the history of intellectuals. It is a fact that the conditions to intervene in politics were more difficult for women than for men due to the absence of autonomy and of the insufficient symbolic capital which is established by the social, economic and cultural capital.

Intellectual women fought for speech rights, for getting public platforms and visibility in the public. Against this background, the centre of attention of the presentation with a following discussion is therefore directed to women, who had interfered in the political arena through public statements. The case-study "Léo Wanner" presents one strategy of female intervention. The central question that motivates this paper and presentation is how did Léo Wanner intervene in the political arena, for which key-values did she stand, and for what did she campaign? The other question then becomes: can a specifically female intellectual intervention be constituted?

Léo Wanner as an example for an intellectual woman, as distinguished from other intellectual contemporaries, can show the ways of writing, the networks and strategies of intellectual women to change the criteria of perception and division of the public. The historians Michel Dreyfus and Georges Oved see in Léo Wanner the first communist journalist that evoked sympathy in the French press with the marocain national independence group "Jeunes Marocains". As a feminist, she was committed to women's suffrage and women's rights in the 1920s. As a publicist she took with her journal "S.O.S." an important role for the French section of the "Women's International League for Peace and Freedom". She travelled to Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco where she met other intellectuals but also alone to Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. The voyages in the colonial territories and protectorates of France brought her to campaign against imperialism as a journalist. She spoke out against the repression of the indigenous population in the colonial territories of North Africa and the Middle East. Anti-imperialism, pacifism, anti-fascism and feminism: these attitudes embodied the French Léo Wanner in her role as an intellectual during the interwar period.

The thesis is that in the interwar period in France, intellectual women interfered in public less as individual social figures; rather they joined a collective or created a collective together in order to increase their effectiveness in the political arena. Consequently, the presentation will analyze the political intervention of intellectual woman, with the example of the case-study Léo Wanner, between the two World Wars in France.

### **Alexandre Boza**

#### *The reinvention of human rights in the interwar*

The interwar period was marked by a European renewal of rights thinking. The changing in policy scale is not anymore an outlook, but begins to be implemented by the League of Nations and its satellite organizations, especially the ILO. We observe then a transformation of the reference framework, highlighting the early international lawyers' efforts to formalize it, along with the transnational development of "humanity policies" driven by labour lawyers. Developing humanitarian action and implementing political and social rights are two main aspects of this approach; our communication would insist on the latter. By speaking of "reinvention" we assume that human rights acquire during this period a new materiality through the renewal of discourses and reflections on these rights. The concept is no longer discussed by politicians keen on philosophy only, but also by political economy lawyers - Scelle and William Oualid for example in the French case. We will analyze the making of these rights by questioning the central concept of "epistemic community". We will study the articulation of academic and political worlds in the production of ideas on human rights.

1415 – 1500

*How to Study the Early Modern Public Sphere?  
Methodological Reflections*

### **Zachris Haaparinne**

#### *The 18th century culture of print and the dilemmas of the public sphere*

When studying early modern Britain, the 17th and 18th centuries in particular, the variety of potential primary sources is enormous. There is a vast collection of parliamentary records from both the Houses, a vibrant press exceptional in both quality and quantity, hundreds of thousands of pamphlets,

and an immeasurable amount of more popular prints, such as broadsides, ballads, and newsletters, published throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century. But despite the amplitude of primary sources, the amount of studies utilizing these collections in their full extent have been but modest. The times, however, they are a-changing. Extensive digital archives with full-text search engines have revolutionized the field of early modern political history. These archives, such as the Eighteenth Century Collection Online and the History of Parliamentary Papers, have enabled historians, political scientists, and linguists, most notably, to process unprecedented amounts of primary sources. They have proven to be particularly useful to conceptual historians, as myself, as the full-text search engines enable to search for exact choices of words.

Because of the growing possibilities to combine vast collections of various primary sources, it has become increasingly important to concern the interrelations of the different source types. Parliamentary records and broadsides, for example, are not commensurate, distinguished by a variety of factors, nor incompatible, often engaged in debates on common subjects. But how exactly do these different types of sources adjust to each other? What was, for example, the dominant sphere in regard to the process of conceptual formation? How to combine newspapers and magazines with parliamentary records when studying parliamentary proceedings? I argue that the abundance of early modern primary sources should be employed in a more comprehensive manner, but with increasingly critical focus on their mutual hierarchy.

The paper is based on my doctoral thesis in-progress: *The voice of the people or raving of the rabble?: A comparative trans-Atlantic analysis of disputes on political representation in Britain and its Thirteen Colonies, 1721 – 1776.*

1515 – 1645

*Approaches to Political and Intellectual History:  
Frame Analysis and Re-thought Marxism*

### **Anders Dalsager**

*Organizational and ideational developments among Danish Social Democratic Youth 1945-75: The value of frame-oriented sociological approaches to political discourse in researching the history of a party political youth movement*

During the last five decades theoretical approaches to political discourse has developed intensely in the social and human sciences. In historical studies, Foucault-inspired research, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Koselleck-inspired conceptual history have become some of the important sources of inspiration to analyze political developments. In hands-on empirical studies of the interplay between social practice, organizational requirements and the development of political ideas in specific political movements, it may however also be worthwhile for historians to draw inspiration from the frame-oriented discourse analysis of movement sociology. Within this field, scholars like David Snow and Robert Benford has combined elements of theories of resource mobilization, social constructionism and structuralism to analyze the way in which actors in social movements spontaneously and strategically develop political narratives in the form of frames on specific issues to promote ideological beliefs, mobilize possible adherents and to provide a sense of political community among followers. In this way, concepts from sociological framing theory seems to provide tools to combine textual discourse analysis with close empirical studies of surrounding social contexts in the studies of movement history. With inspiration from the works of Snow and Benford and on basis of an analysis of the development of attitudes towards the global East-West Conflict in the Danish Social Democratic Youth Movement (DSU) during the two periods of 1946-1949 and 1964-68, this paper will therefore analyze

- 1) Whether it is possible to identify specific, dominating (“master”) frames in the external political communication of the DSU leadership concerning the East-West Conflicts during the two periods;
- 2) Whether it is possible to identify processes of strategic framing in the development of this external political communication among the different DSU leaders;
- 3) Which aspects of the political developments in the DSU that especially comes into focus – and which that are less emphasized - when the framing concepts of Snow and Benford is employed.

The hypothesis of the paper is that the employment of sociological framing theory can help to bridge the gap between text and social practice in analytical approaches, which can be difficult in especially some types of CDA. And that it can provide an understanding of specific types of agencies found in

political movements. It is however also the expectation that the mentioned theoretical framework needs special application to be employed in the analysis of organizations other than the non-party aligned protest movements of the 1960's and on, which has been of special interest to a.o. David Snow.

## Selim Nadi

### *On the Marxist Methodology in the History of Political Ideas*

This paper aims to contribute to the methodological debate in intellectual history. Today, Quentin Skinner's approach to the history of political ideas – a “third way” between an internal and an external approach of texts – has become almost hegemonic in the study of European intellectual history. Skinner's methodology seems gripped by a schematic anti-Marxism that sees the Marxist approach to ideas as “mechanical”; a pure reflection of economic issues, underestimating the epistemological autonomy, which political ideas can have. However, this view seems to be ignoring the possibilities offered by the Marxist methodology in intellectual history. The goal of this paper is to give an overview of Marxists theorists whose concepts and methodology should be seriously discussed in the social sciences (and particularly in history). However, it also analyses the internal debate in the Marxist Theory of History regarding the meaning of political ideas. This paper attempts to reassert the fact that “historians cannot construct viable models of the periods they deal with without a grasp of theory and without attempts to use it creatively” (Banaji, 2010). The main thesis of this paper is that there is an alternative approach to the Cambridge school of intellectual history that does not fall into the trap of economical – in fact technological – reductionism. This paper argues that even though the Skinnerian approach led to a renewal in intellectual history it, nevertheless did not fully grasp the dialectical linkage between political Ideas and human activities. By looking both at Marxist linguists (Jean-Pierre Lefebvre) and at historians of political thought (like Neal Wood) we could propose a new way to approach the social role ideas have in History rather than simply analyzing them as purely mental concepts or verbal signs. Being part of a PhD methodological reflection, this paper attempts to give an important place to ideas in history by asking: what does “contextualization” means and how can

ideas have a relevant place in historiographical issues that deal with social life and structures? Indeed, can Marxism be a reconciliation point between historians and political theorists? A discussion on the novelty and the limits of Marxist methodology is important: it prevents intellectual history from falling into the trap made by Foucault who defended the idea that Marxism “exists in nineteenth-century thought as a fish exists in water; that is, it ceases to breathe anywhere else” but that its methodology is still relevant today.

### **1700 Michel Foucault as Historian of Political Thought**

Keynote by Duncan Kelly

When Michel Foucault famously advised us in the 1970s that we must ‘abandon the juridical model of sovereignty’ in order to focus on the diverse and unclear ways in which power operates in our societies, he had first to show why. To do so, he explored ways in which the history of political thinking in Europe particularly has been dominated by models of sovereignty both before and after the French Revolution. By turning to the history of political thought, Foucault the classical epistemologist tried both to lay bare the sorts of claims made by the state to legitimacy and political knowledge, or reason, by showing the ways in which the so-called ‘forgotten past’ nevertheless remains ‘profoundly described’ in the present (*Society Must be Defended*, p. 56). In the mid to late 1970s, then, during a moment of profound crisis in Western European capitalism, Foucault produced three sets of lecture courses offering three overlapping sets of genealogies of the ‘forgotten past’ in the contemporary present, through the language of reason of state (juridical sovereignty and war) and its other (the pastoral state); through the prism of population and territory (governmentality and security); and through a different account of war to trace the origins of neoliberalism (in forms of ‘biopolitics’). My lecture attempts to explore some of these developments in the context of Foucault’s intellectual development, political commitments, and contemporary interventions, in order to puzzle out what sort of an historian of political thought, if any, he might reasonably be taken to be.

**FRIDAY, 24 JUNE**

0930 – 1100

*Liberal Internationalism in the Interwar Period*

### **Emil Eiby Seidenfaden**

*‘Bureaucratic cosmopolitanism?’ The Public Information Sections of the League of Nations and the United Nations 1920-1960.*

This abstract represents the PhD-part of the historical research-project *The Invention of International Bureaucracy – the League of Nations and the Creation of International Public Administration*. This project is initiated by Karen Gram-Skjoldager. Aside from mapping the under-researched area of civil services within intergovernmental organizations this project attempts to speak to “the broader scholarly and public discussion about the political quality and legitimacy of international bureaucracies.” The project aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of such international bodies by moving away from a traditional Weberian perspective on international bureaucracy and employing the theoretical framework of French political sociologists like Antoine Vauchez. His ideas of intergovernmental organizations as “transnational fields of social activity bound together by common beliefs” and by the “struggle over resources across the national-international divide” may shed new light on the inner cores of early intergovernmental organizations. Against this backdrop the PhD project aims to develop an understanding of the Public Information Section of the League of Nations Secretariat and its legacy and afterlife in the United Nations Secretariat. Aside from embedded ideas of the dependency on “international public opinion” prominent in these sections little is known of the self-images and possible ideological commonalities of these public relations-bureaucrats. By exploring these as well as the intellectual conflicts of this small group of international civil servants it is hoped that new light will be shed on the aforementioned debate of legitimacy and transparency within intergovernmental organizations of the interwar and postwar periods.

Sources:

Asides from open sources, the project “is based on extensive, multi-archival research at, among others, the League of Nations archives at the UN Office at

Geneva which holds the large and still underused collections of documents created by and related to the League.” (quotes are from the project outline). Link to the overall project: <http://projects.au.dk/inventingbureaucracy/>

## **Søren Friis**

*Social Science Diplomacy: Dimensions of Transnational Networking at Denmark's First International Studies Think Tank*

The years following the First World War saw vibrant political debate on the issue of achieving peaceful international cooperation. Such debate found a home – if not several – within the League of Nations, as witnessed by a stream of recent books on the League's bodies and the (liberal) internationalists who inhabited them. In the sphere of intellectual internationalism, a key development was the creation of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in Paris in 1926, which arguably became the organizational centre in several interconnected networks of academics, diplomats, decision-makers and philanthropic agents from an array of countries and institutions. In 1928, an annual International Studies Conference (ISC) was established under the IIIC, its initial membership made up of a number of European and American research institutions, or think-tanks, set up in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles. Although these were, for the purposes of the ISC, described as “institutions for the scientific study of international relations,” their varied origins and academic emphasis were far more diverse than this label suggested. However, little is known about the role of many of these think-tanks within the network. This paper focuses on the ISC's first Nordic member, the Institute of Economics and History (Institutet for Historie og Samfundsøkonomi, IHS) in Copenhagen, Denmark, which was established in 1927 on the initiative of a small group of intellectuals led by Peter Munch, a historian and leader of the Social Liberal Party, through funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and others. From the perspective of conceptual history, this paper explores the shifting relationship between key international(ist) concepts of peace, security and economics through interactions between the institute's core intellectuals and its transnational network. It develops the argument that while the initial aim of the IHS was to strengthen interdisciplinary “scientific” work within the social sciences, in

adapting to new demands from key stakeholders – i.e. the entangled networks of the ISC and its transatlantic funders – the IHS during the 1930s assumed the features of a foreign affairs institute focusing particularly on problems within international life which connected the two spheres of security and economics. This security-economics “nexus” arguably represented an early and influential conception of the relationship between key objects of concern in the field of International Studies – one shaped, in this case, by the mutual reinforcement of growing demands for (security) policy-relevant economic expertise and the “peace”-centred approach this Danish think-tank both supplied and symbolized. This initial study of the IHS and its network(ing) aims to bring into dialogue recent contributions in political and transnational history, but also conceptual and intellectual history, which have, firstly, traced the broad organisational outlines of interwar intellectual cooperation and the prominent role of think-tanks and foundations; secondly, described the ideological contestations involved in “local” internationalist institution-building in various ways; and, thirdly, taken steps toward connecting interwar economic thought (e.g. among neoliberal intellectuals) to the diplomatic institutions of the period, not least the IIIC. Finally, this paper suggests the need for a critical conversation with today's social sciences on the frequent, even naturalized, claims of a causal and inextricable relationship between security concerns and economic issues, the so-called “security-development nexus”.

1115 – 1245

*Transnational Conceptual Struggles after 1945: Neoliberalism and Left Radicalism*

## **Arne Kaethner**

*West-Germany as Neoliberal Pioneer: Transnational Conceptual Struggles about the 'Good Society' in the post-war period (1945-1963)*

The struggle about the right economic order seen as a key social, political and cultural conflict in postwar Europe presents the starting point of my research project. Not only within the Eastern Bloc, but across the European continent socialist demands and the idea of economic planning were predominant after 1945. Contrary to the prevalent 'Zeitgeist' and the

measures taken by the occupying powers, West Germany surprisingly quickly returned to and consolidated a market order – decades before the liberal doctrine rose in popularity elsewhere and was reestablished as the dominant world view. To explain this development and to explicate how it was possible not only to implement liberal policies against the predominant public mood, but also to establish and consolidate a market economy as an incontrovertible ideal order, is a central research objective.

The liberal doctrine, it is presumed, owes its ascendancy to the strong advocacy of neo-respectively ordoliberal scholars, their networks and conceptual frameworks promoted during the first postwar decades. These 'theorists' are seen as major agents of political change, having successfully spread and engraved their convictions among political practitioners and the wider public. The investigation will accordingly focus on the related- but likewise competing visions of an ideal society that had been developed among neoliberal scholars and successfully embedded within the political discourse in West-Germany.

The neoliberal scholars used national as well as transnational fora and networks to discuss the terms and conditions for 'liberal' societies. The leading principles and concepts just as the ways of dissemination, however, were in fact contested. It is one goal of the project to assess whose concepts and arguments were successful in what fora and for what reasons. By ways of taking transnational networks into account – comparing and contrasting the debates and the provided lines of reasoning within the transnational and national fora – the project sheds light on the transfer of concepts and the relationship between transnational norm creation and national implementation.

The project is based on a conceptual approach, paying close attention to the semantic and pragmatic aspects of the agent's utterances as strategic discursive means employed to gain hegemony within the public-political sphere.

## **Juho Saksholm**

*Political concepts and transnational entanglements of the Sixties radical movements in Finland, Sweden, and West Germany, 1956 - 1968*

The explicit internationality of the radical movements of the Sixties has long been one of the

most important aspects associated with the subject. Most of the studies considering these movements have not, however, focused on the tangible aspects of this self-proclaimed internationality. When the transnational entanglements are a subject of consideration, the solidarity of the movements towards third world countries and their freedom fighters is emphasized. International solidarity was strongly advocated by the radicals themselves as they strived to represent their international connections as something completely new and unique. The most frequent international contacts were, however, established with radicals from countries culturally and geographically near. Regardless of their manifested global solidarity, they still predominantly operated in a Northern European context. This aspect of traditionality has still been largely neglected in studies considering the radical movements and especially their international influences.

In my doctoral thesis I focus on the transnational entanglements between Finnish, Swedish, and West German radical movements, and in my presentation I concentrate on the research plan of my study. The study will examine both the new left movement, which struggled to establish a new, democratic (and non-Soviet) version of socialism, and the student movement. Both the Finnish and the Swedish student movements emerged as liberal "cultural radicalism", emphasizing individual rights and opposition to censorship. During the later Sixties, the student movements aligned with political parties; in Finland the movement associated with Soviet-aligned communism and in Sweden with Maoism. In West Germany, anew, the division between new leftists and student radicals was not as extreme. Both movements worked close to each other from the beginning, often in cooperational organisations.

Despite the differences on the organisational level, North European radical groups shared a common transnational discourse. They all shared an interest in common issues related to postwar societies, such as the war and its legacy, the role of the Soviet Union and its allies, and the state of democracy in the West. The radical movements shared certain key perspectives and objectives regarding these issues. They had a common understanding of their perceived enemies and of the policies necessary for providing a better, more democratic future. These shared views were clearly visible in the process of

conceptual construction of the movements, due to which I examine these concepts and their use in the radical discussions. I also focus on the transmission of these concepts and thus the broader transnational entanglements of the North European radical movements. The radical agenda was constructed mostly within the press. Some of the journals were directly associated with the radical organisations while others were more broadly defined culturally liberal journals. Nevertheless, all of these papers shared a common emphasis on a deliberative society. It was commonly believed amongst the editors, who often identified strongly with the radical groups, that the deliberation could in itself help advance progressive values and equality. Defining the key concepts of this change was a vital factor in initiating the process of societal change.

1415 – 1500 *Early Neoliberalism's Scientification*

### **Martin Beddeleem**

*Early Neoliberalism, or how to Rescue the Dismal Science of Liberalism*

"Neoliberalism is dead!....and it is not good news!" proclaimed the title of a recent blogpost reviewing some recent literature on the history of neoliberalism. In the fallout of the Global Financial Crisis, the author concluded that "it might be time for those who have been blindly trusting in markets, to put the 'neo' back into liberalism and acknowledge that markets are not self-healing, but require a strong state to protect markets from themselves and society from markets." That a strong state, acting through "market conforming" interventions, embody the quintessence of the 'neo' in 'neoliberalism' may seem odd to our contemporary ears, yet it represented a basis of agreement when neoliberalism first came to light. This cognitive dissonance between present-day neoliberalism and its different historical stages signals a much larger issue for the political historian: how to circumscribe the transformist phenomenon of neoliberalism, even when one disregards the thorny issue of the correspondence of neoliberal practices with neoliberal theories?

The sophisticated accounts of the development of neoliberalism published nowadays have departed significantly from the stylized and normative stories which were written one to two decades ago when scholars started to wrap their head around the concept of neoliberalism. This historiographical

revision of neoliberalism has lent more focus on the period of its inception from 1930 to 1970 and has abandoned a retrodictive understanding of its development. To some extent, the interpretative link between the history of neoliberalism and its contemporary political valence has been severed. Moreover, one of the most thorough intellectual archaeologies of neoliberalism concluded that "there was not one neoliberalism, but several neoliberalisms" and that we should beware of confusing the various "paradigms" which are gathered under this umbrella.

In consequence, any attempt to recover genetically an "authentic" source or to arbitrate between the various definitions must lead to a truncated view of neoliberalism. To achieve a comprehensive outlook of the amalgamation of early neoliberalism, something cruelly lacking in the present literature, it is necessary to take some distance with the quest for an alpha cradle of neoliberalism. Instead, we suggest to adopt a nuanced plurality which remains sensitive to the historical contingency within which the term has evolved. The theory of neoliberalism can be understood as "a shared problem space" where matters of disagreements and consensus evolved over time. Its "consolidation" involved both "densifications, intensifications, reinforcements" as well as "intervals," "inequalities," and "holes" which impacted its different levels of consistency: epistemological, ideological and organizational. This contradictory process itself was creative of neoliberalism, its beginning already "in-between, intermezzo" along different timelines which converged in the late 1930s.

1515 – 1645

*Neo-Corporatism and Flexicurity: Dutch and Nordic Forms of Economisation.*

### **Tom Høctor**

*Neoliberalism with a Nordic face? UK governance networks and 'flexicurity' c.2005 – 2015*

The aims of this paper are threefold. Firstly, it will set out the interactive governance paradigm. The paper examines the development of the theory in response to separate but related literatures on governance (e.g. (Rhodes 1997) and policy networks (Mayntz 1993)). It will then set out the interactive governance paradigm as developed by Torfing et al (2012). Torfing's approach is here used to



complement the discourse theoretical approach developed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001; Laclau 1990; Laclau 1993).

Secondly, the paper will map two governance networks, which have been particularly concerned with the Nordic Model in the period from 2005. These will be glossed as the 'free market' network and the 'flexicurity' network. The paper will propose and examine the argument that while these networks approach the Nordic Model from completely different perspectives, their conclusions suggest strikingly similar methodological, political and strategic considerations. The paper will consider attempts to rearticulate the historical Nordic welfare state, a phenomenon I have called 'welfare state revisionism'. In keeping with the body of my thesis there will be sustained focus on the policy prescriptions which follow from constructions of the Nordic Model emphasizing active labour market strategies, gender equality, and entrepreneurialism. Thirdly and finally, the paper will suggest broader implications for the Nordic Model in the UK and sketch out a direction for future research projects using the interactive governance paradigm to analyse policy discourse. Most significantly, it offers the beginnings of a path beyond discourse as speech act or image and towards a means to theorise how the material effects of transnational policy diffusion can be analysed using discursive methodologies. The interactive governance approach has been selected as part of a wider approach to the question of how Nordic policies and discourse about the Nordic Model has informed contemporary British reform programmes. An extended discussion of 'flexicurity' forms the fifth chapter of my thesis: 'The Nordic Model 2.0', which examines how the Nordic Model has been rearticulated in British governance networks since the 1990s to support 'Third Way' and neoliberal reforms in the fields of health, education and the labour market. This chapter is currently in development and the opportunity to present my work and receive feedback from other scholars would be helpful to further refine my ideas.

## Tom Schuringa

### *Economic professionalization as a driving force to the Dutch 'poldermodel'*

Ever since Philippe Schmitter named the twentieth century 'the century of corporatism', scholars have tried to pin down the distinctive elements of the new

post-war 'neo'-corporatist structures.<sup>1</sup> Many of them were concerned with the democratic nature of the emerging concertation politics, others scrutinized the varying players that constituted the new consultation and policymaking bodies from a national or transnational perspective.<sup>2</sup> Little attention has been paid to one of the most important developments that precluded and accompanied the emergence of neo-corporatist political structures: the swift professionalization of economics.<sup>3</sup> In my dissertation I intend to clarify how this process evolved in the Netherlands from the first nineteenth century attempts to promote statistics, to the post-war establishment of a wide range of influential political economic institutions. In my paper, I will explain how the discourses on 'expert politics', neo-corporatism and the classic institutional approach came together and can be observed in an even wider timeframe by searching for one communal aspect: the demand for economic professionals and their subsequent entrance in all layers of politics and civil service. I argue that the Dutch case can serve as an example for transnational comparative research, as other countries will have similar experiences. By doing this, I hope to prove that these developments did not occur accidentally, but that they were thoroughly orchestrated and stimulated by the most prominent actors in the political arena, i.e. in parliament, in the political parties and in the labor and employers unions.<sup>4</sup> I will do so by reassessing the debates that were held when the major departmental and party institutions that contributed to economic policymaking were installed. I try to discern, out of the various

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<sup>1</sup> Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Still the Century of Corporatism?' in: *The review of politics* 36 (1974) no. 1, p. 85-131, and for example Gerhard Lehbruch, *Patterns of corporatist policy-making* (Beverly Hills 1982), Leo Panitch, 'Recent theorizations of corporatism: reflections on a growth industry' in: *The British Journal of Sociology* 31 (1980) no. 2, 159-187.

<sup>2</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and its critics* (New Haven 1989), and for example Hanna Pitkin, *The concept of representation* (Berkeley en Los Angeles 1967). Robert H. Nelson 'Introduction and summary' in: Joseph A. Pechman ed., *The role of the economist in government. An international perspective* (New York 1989) 1-23, en R.L. Maris, 'The position of economics and economists in the government machine, a comparative critique of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands', in: *The economic journal*, LXIV (1954) 759-783. Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, A. Lans Bovenberg, Eric E.C. van Damme en Jarig van Sinderen eds., *Economic science and practice. The roles of academic economists and policy-makers* (Cheltenham en Lyme 1997).

<sup>3</sup> A.W. Bob Coats, *The sociology and professionalization of economics* (Londen en New York 1993).

<sup>4</sup> J. de Beus en H. van den Doel, 'Interest groups in Dutch domestic politics' in: Richard T. Griffiths, *The economy and politics of the Netherlands since 1945* (Dordrecht 1980) 163-197.

arguments that were brought up, the importance of economic expertise and the way those experts were introduced. In my paper I will present an example of this, and a theoretical reflection on how this might be useful for transnational comparative research.

### **1700 On Thought Collectives and Think Tank Archipelagos: The History of Transnational Neoliberalism**

Keynote by Dieter Plehwe

Neoliberalism has been subject to a fair amount of confused, and confusing, debate in the past. For many it remained unclear if neoliberalism has a distinct meaning. A brand new paper of the IMF instead clearly states "There has been a strong and widespread global trend toward neoliberalism since the 1980s." The authors single out the introduction of competition in many economic spheres, financial liberalization, and austerity. (Jonathan D. Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri, *Neoliberalism: oversold?* IMF, 2016). Recent literature tackles important factors that help explaining neoliberalism's surprising resilience like the shift towards shareholder value in corporate governance or the post-democratic turn from accountable democratic government to stakeholder governance. The debate of institutional transformation, however, also displays common shortcomings of comparative literature: the primary pre-occupation with national societies and economies and the predominant interest in logic of difference regardless of evident varieties of neoliberalism and international convergence. Critical dimensions of neoliberalism organized across borders are curiously absent. This gap can be filled by way of pursuing a transnational history of neoliberal intellectuals, think tanks, and ideas. Ludwig Fleck's and Karl Mannheim's understanding of thought collectives responsible for the (re-) production of specific thought styles are revisited in order to emphasize the process of cross-border institutionalization of neoliberal knowledge and power.

**SATURDAY, 25 JUNE**

1000 – 1130

*Liberalism, the Welfare State and Public Choice*

**Kristina Krake**

*Scandinavian crisis policy as defence of democracy in the 1930s*

The paper examines the rhetoric of the crisis policy in Scandinavian interwar period in order to answer whether the coalition between the agrarian and workers parties can be understood as defence of democracy or regular crisis ad hoc policy. The historiography claims that the coalition between peasants and workers took a potential electoral base away from the fascists. Particularly the famous 'Crisis Agreements' between the agrarian and workers parties (that took place in Denmark January 1933, Sweden May 1933, Norway March 1935) has been regarded to play a key role to the fact that the fascist movements remained a relatively marginal phenomenon. Rather than reproduce a narrative about the Scandinavian crisis agreements, the paper analyzes arguments and alliances related to the crisis negotiations, based on representative selection of sources, provided from systematic studies of printed materials and empirical archive studies. With the emphasis placed on Danish conditions the paper illustrates to which extent the fear of extremism appeared as an argument in parliamentary debates, public press material and confidential discussions within the parties. The paper will argue, that the crisis policy was based on pragmatic motives, but the Social Democratic parties began to articulate the crisis policy in terms of security policy after the rise of fascism in Germany. At the same time the addressing of political extremes and the defence of democracy could be used as arguments to convince the public of the need to reform the society in a more social direction, which laid the foundation for post war welfare states. Regarding the agrarian parties, the paper argues, that they primarily took into account their own electoral base, whereas concern for democratic stability played a minor role although the Scandinavian fascist movement were supported by parts of the rural population.

The overall framework for the paper is my PhD project on the Scandinavian democracies response to subversive movements (from anti-parliamentary movements to communism and fascism) in the

interwar period 1919-1939. The project is based on the research question: Why did extremism not succeed in getting power in the three Scandinavian countries in the interwar period considering the young and fragile democracies were potentially vulnerable to anti-democratic movements' alternative ideas of political governance and social organization.

The project operates with a three-phased research strategy: Firstly the explanations of the failure of extremism can be due to the extremist movements themselves such as incompetent leaders, internal strife etc. Secondly it can be due to the contemporary political system, more specifically democratic agents and party system dynamics. Thirdly partial explanations may need to be sought in the political cultural history prior to the interwar period. As the project focus on the second phase, the political systems response to extremist movements, the answers will be found within this research field. However, the dissertation takes into account in the state of the art chapter the explanations due to the extremist movements, and in the final chapter with conclusive remarks and perspective considerations the dissertation discuss explanations prior to the interwar period such as nation state building, parliamentary culture and democratization processes.

Theoretically, the project relies on the international research on fascism. Particularly Robert Paxton's theories on political practice, political space and the 'five stages of fascism' are tested on Scandinavian source material provided in the present project. In order to identify similarities and differences that may explain why the Scandinavian democracies proved to be resistant to dictatorship, I use the asymmetric comparative method, divided into three case studies that represent essential political arenas: 1) Crisis policy in terms of security policy and society reforming program. 2) Legislation and political violence. 3) Anti-fascist and anti-communist propaganda and the rhetoric of social and liberal democracy.

The study results can be summarized as follows: The challenge of the Scandinavian countries in interwar period, marked by economic crisis and ineffective parliamentary system, was to keep the masses within the framework of parliamentary democracy. As means to combat subversive movements, which appealed to the unemployed and indebted farmers, the politicians initiated economic and social reforms

although the main reason was acute crisis management. Furthermore, to avoid the growth of political violence and antidemocratic political practice the MPs imposed preventive legislation such as temporary ban on political uniform and ban on militant corps even though it paradoxically restricted the democratic right to form organisations and express political views by external means. In addition, the Scandinavian national parliaments discussed restrictions against anti-democratic views but decided not to ban parties for the sake of the constitutional principle of freedom of speech. Instead the political elite intensified the anti-fascist and anti-communist rhetoric, especially the Danish Social Democratic Party established a propaganda centre in response to the aggressive agitation from fascists, communists and the right-wing conservative youth.

### **Jacob Jensen**

*The Anatomy of Government Failure: Public Choice Theory and the Deconstruction of Democracy*

At its most basic, public choice theory is the application of rational choice theory to political and bureaucratic processes. Whereas welfare economists analyse market failures, public choice theorists analyse government failures. Treating politics as if it is a market, they assume that politicians, voters, and bureaucrats act only according to self-interest. Barely visible when it emerged in the early 1950s, by the 1990s rational choice approaches to politics accounted for more than thirty-five percent of articles in the *American Political Science Review*, the discipline's leading journal.

This paper explores the origins of public choice theory, arguing that its birth cannot be fully explained without placing it in the larger context of the crisis of political theory, which unfolded in the interwar period and persisted throughout the immediate postwar decades. In this context, rational choice provided a viable theoretical framework to handle the problem of the public.

1145 – 1230

*Memory Diplomacy*

### **Jette Klockmann**

*Hiroshima and Nagasaki Remembrance in the UN by the Mayors for Peace*

The nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 became an event with a globalizing force. The collective memory of the bombings has been key for a wide array of nuclear weapons abolition NGOs both inside and outside Japan. One of these is the transnational Hiroshima-based NGO 'Mayors for Peace' which was established by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1982. Today, this organization has more than 6,000 member cities worldwide. Heavily engaged with the nuclear disarmament agenda and firm believers in the potential power of the United Nations, the Mayors for Peace leadership in Hiroshima and Nagasaki have actively promoted remembrance of the bombings in the UN, and their efforts have only increased in the 21st century.

In this paper, I outline the ways in which the Mayors for Peace have worked to further institutionalization of the memory of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the United Nations. Increased institutionalization of the memory in the UN, a global arena for nuclear disarmament negotiations, can serve to influence the value system shared by diplomats engaged with nuclear disarmament by making remembrance activities surrounding that memory obligatory.

The Mayors for Peace have primarily promoted Hiroshima and Nagasaki remembrance by tapping into the moral authority traditionally credited to survivors or witnesses of atrocity. Subsequent mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have presented themselves as witnesses themselves when feasible, turning increasingly through the years to survivor testimonies, photographic evidence and symbolic artefacts to enhance the proximity of themselves and their statements to the actual events of the bombings. Additionally, the Mayors for Peace have, with considerable success, invited high-ranking UN officials and younger disarmament diplomats in training to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to somehow become witnesses themselves who can pass on their experience to others. This can be defined as a 'communicative memory strategy' in which the collective memory of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is presented as direct communications from witness to audience without any layers of interpretation and with the moral authority of witness testimony.

1230 – 1300 *Final Discussion and Announcements*

**1300 Lunch and End of Conference**

**Thanks for coming, have a safe trip home – and stay in touch!**